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Abstract
Over the last two decades immigration policies in OECD economies have become increas-
ingly selective and the rate of skilled migration from low income economies has risen markedly.
This paper analyzes the theoretical implications of this shift in migration patterns for the
growth and distribution of world income and population using a model with endogenous edu-
cation, fertility and migration decisions in both the sending and receiving economies. It shows
that Brain Drain migration may cause fertility to fall and human capital accumulation to in-
crease in both the sending and receiving economies. It also shows that the world economy may
converge to a special kind of core-periphery equilibrium where increasing inequality between
countries is fueled by Brain Drain migration but where, nonetheless, the welfare of agents in
both the core and the periphery is increased. Thus Brain Drain migration may increase in-
equality between countries at the same time as reducing world poverty and increasing world
growth.
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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
The world distribution of income depends on the relative size of countries’ population as well
as on the distribution of income within and across countries. This paper analyzes the potential
impact of the current trend towards predominantly skilled emigration from poor to rich countries
on fertility, human capital formation and growth in both the sending and receiving countries, and
hence on the world distribution of income. The paper shows that this trend towards a ‘Brain Drain’
pattern in international migration is likely to reinforce the current reduction in world inequality
driven by the rise in GDP per capita in large, intermediate-income countries but also predicts a
potential for divergence in the long run as poor countries grow larger in terms of population size.
Over the last 25 years migration has become increasingly skill biased. Emigration rates are
three times higher than average among the highly skilled and twelve times higher for emigrants
from poor countries, see Docquier and Marfouk (2005). This trend has been caused by both
increasingly selective immigration policies in OECD countries on the demand side, together with
the tendency for workers to positively self-select into migration on the supply side.1 This signiﬁcant
development in the world economy gives rise to important economic questions. Is the phenomenon
of Brain Drain emigration likely to be a transitory or a permanent feature of the world economy?
Will this Brain Drain migration increase the rate of economic growth in the world economy? And
in the sending and receiving economies? Will the Brain Drain promote convergence or divergence
in the world distribution of income? Should the sending or receiving economies try to stop or limit
this ﬂow of people?
To answer these questions this paper develops a model with endogenous education, fertility
and migration decisions by individual agents in both the sending and receiving economies. It
shows that selective migration may improve the growth rate and reduce the fertility rate of all
economies in the world economy. Furthermore even when both economies beneﬁt from Brain
Drain migration it is still possible that the advanced economies beneﬁt more from this process
and for an unbalanced ‘core-periphery’ growth equilibrium for the world economy to exist. Note
however that this core periphery equilibrium need not imply decreases in the income of agents in
the periphery. In such an equilibrium, increased inequality of income in the world may actually
be good for world growth and also good for the absolute income levels of the poor.2
This paper contributes signiﬁcantly to the brain drain literature in two ways. Firstly it
1See section 2.1 below for a discussion of the empirical trends.
2See Perotti (1993) and Benabou (1996) for discussion of the mechanism whereby inequality eﬀects growth.
1provides a dynamic analysis of the eﬀects of the brain drain on both the sending and receiving
economies. This allows for an analysis of the eﬀects of brain drain migration on the growth and
distribution of world income. This is an important contribution since the previous literature, from
the seminal papers of Bhagwati and Hamada (1974, 1975) to the more recent models of Mountford
(1997), Beine et al. (2001) or Kanbur and Rapoport (2005), have only analyzed the implications
for the sending economy. The analysis is also important because it demonstrates that the eﬀects
of migration on the sending and receiving economies need not be mirror images of one another.
In particular it is shown how it is possible for brain drain migration to reduce fertility rates and
increase the rates of human capital accumulation and economic growth in both the sending and
receiving economies.
This paper’s second contribution to the literature is that it is the ﬁrst paper to link the
brain drain to fertility decisions. This is important because the shape of the world distribution of
income is aﬀected by the relative numbers of people in advanced and less advanced economies as
well as by their relative income per head and it is a fact that sending countries tend to have higher
rates of fertility and lower levels of human capital accumulation than the receiving economies.
This paper uses a Becker (1981) quality versus quantity trade oﬀ argument for fertility decisions
to show how these patterns may be reinforced by brain drain migration in equilibrium.
The growth in selective migration is almost surely related to another key empirical phenom-
enon which has been the subject of a great deal of recent economic analysis, namely, the expansion
in human capital accumulation in developing and developed economies. In this paper we adopt
the approach of Galor and Moav (2000) in modeling this rise in human capital accumulation in
the world economy. Galor and Moav (2000) argue that education makes workers more adaptable
and so makes them relatively more productive in conditions of technological change. Thus while
the level of technology is skill-neutral, the rate of growth of technology is skill-biased. We extend
this approach to the international environment by assuming that the rate of growth of frontier
technology is skill-biased but that the rate of growth from internationally diﬀused or imitation
technology is not skill biased. When brain drain migration is added to this environment there is
a two way interaction between growth and the migration of skilled workers. Higher technological
growth in an advanced economy increases the incentives for agents to migrate to the advanced
economy and this spurs (gross) human capital accumulation in the sending economy. Skilled im-
migration also increases the growth rate of technology in the advanced economy and this further
increases the incentives for skilled agents to migrate to the advanced economy as well as increases
2the incentives for human capital accumulation in the advanced economy itself.
The potential for Brain Drain migration to be beneﬁcial to the sending economy is based
on the assumption that the ability to migrate is uncertain and that prospects for migration eﬀect
agents’ human capital accumulation decisions in the sending economies, see for example Mountford
(1997) and Kanbur and Rapoport (2005). There is much empirical evidence supporting this
assumption at both the micro and macro level. Micro-level evidence comes mainly from sectoral
case-studies looking at speciﬁc professions (generally health professionals and engineers) in speciﬁc
countries. For example, in their survey on medical doctors working in the UK, Kangasniemi,
Winters and Commander (2004), the respondents estimate that migration prospects aﬀect the
eﬀort of about 40 percent of current medical students in India. 3 Macro-level evidence is provided
by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2003), who found in a cross-section of 50 developing countries
a positive and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of migration prospects on gross human capital formation .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the recent evidence
on the evolution of the world distribution of income and on the growth of brain drain migration
and derives the implications of the latter for the former. The other sections describe the theoretical
model. Section 3 describes an autarkic economy and analyzes its equilibrium when there is no
migration, Section 4 analyzes the impact of brain drain migration on both the sending and receiving
economies, and Section 5 analyzes the dynamic equilibrium in the world economy and derives the
main results of the paper. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical background
This section brieﬂy presents the recent evolution of the world distribution of income, on the one
hand, and of brain drain migration, on the other hand, and discusses the implications of one for
the other in the light of recent brain drain economic research.4
2.1 The growth of ‘brain drain’ migration, 1970-2000
Skilled emigration rates are rising for most developing countries, and tend to be highest in small
and middle-income countries. These trends are shown in Table 1 derived from Docquier and
Defoort (2005) which presents skilled emigration rates and selection biases by region and for
selected developing countries from 1970-2000. It shows a general rise in brain drain emigration
3See also, Robert Lucas (2004 ), in particular pp. 22-23 on the emigration of Filippino graduates.
4See Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters (2004) and Docquier and Rapoport (2004) for detailed surveys of
this literature..
3with skilled emigration rates rising in all the main developing countries except Indonesia and
Turkey.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
This rise in Brain Drain emigration has been caused by a combination of increasingly selec-
tive immigration policies on the demand side and a tendency for workers to positively self-select
into migration on the supply side. On the demand side selective immigration policies (point-
systems), ﬁrst introduced in Australia and Canada in the early 1980s, have gradually spread to
other OECD countries. The U.-S. Immigration Act of 1990, together with the creation of spe-
ciﬁc visas (H1-Bs) for highly skilled professionals, is among the most signiﬁcant changes in the
U.-S. immigration policy of the past twenty years. A growing number of EU countries have then
adopted programs aiming at attracting a qualiﬁed workforce, be it temporarily or permanently
(OECD, 2002) and in some cases, quality-selection has been proclaimed as the new oﬃcial motto
in immigration issues.5
On the supply side the level of education attainments in developing economies have also
been rising throughout this period. However, as detailed in Table 1, the growth of brain drain
migration has in most cases been greater than that of educational attainments in developing
countries, resulting in increased skilled emigration rates.
Table 2 provides estimates of current emigration rates at three education levels for the year
2000 for selected developing countries and for countries grouped by demographic size, income level
(using the World Bank classiﬁcation), and region.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
Table 2 shows that there is a clear decreasing relationship between emigration rates and
country size, which may be simply due to the fact that small countries tend to be more open.
Indeed, from the last two columns of Table 2 it is clear that these diﬀerences cannot be attributed
to the educational structure of the home country population or to a higher ”selection bias” (ratio
of skilled to total emigration rates) in small countries. We also observe from the lower panel of
Table 2 that the largest developing countries exhibit relatively low rates of skilled emigration in
5Most recent examples are the introduction by the UK of a point-system in March 2006 which makes it easier
f o re d u c a t e dm i g r a n t sa n di n v e s t o r st oo b t a i np e r m a n e n tr e sidentship while restricting entry for other categories.
4spite of their being among the main suppliers of highly-skilled emigrants.6 This is notably the
case for India (4.1 per cent), China (3.6 per cent), Indonesia (1.8 per cent) and Brazil (2.2 per
cent). Secondly it is clear that the highest skilled emigration rates are observed in middle-income
countries. The fact that skilled emigration rates tend to be lower in relatively aﬄuent countries is
easily explained by the low wage diﬀerentials between these countries and potential destinations.
The reasons why they are also lower in poor countries are less obvious and could be due to a
variety of causes, including the role of credit constraints on education and migration decisions or
the imperfect transferability of human capital (or ”brain waste”).
2.2 The world distribution of income and population: recent trends
Estimation of the world distribution of income requires the integration of individual country’s
income distributions. Using diﬀerent measures of inequality among world citizens, Sala-I-Martin
(2006) ﬁnds that global inequality remained more or less constant during the 1970s and then
declined during the 1980s and 1990s, with the size of the decline ranging between 4 to 30 percent
depending on the exact inequality measure used. Although relatively modest, this decline is
remarkable in that it comes after a secular trend of rising inequality at the world level (Bourguignon
and Morrisson, 2002). This reversal is more than accounted for by the convergence in income per
capita of countries such as India, China, and other Asian countries, while other regions of the
world (especially Africa, which includes many small-sized countries) have kept diverging. Using a
sub-set of inequality measures that allow for decomposing global inequality between within and
across country inequality, Sala-I-Martin (2006) then shows that global inequality is due mostly
to inequality across countries. However, within-country inequality has been rising since the 1970s
and therefore accounts for an increasingly large share of global inequality — from about one quarter
in 1970 to one third in 2000. Still, this increase in within-country inequality is more than oﬀset by
the decrease in (weigthed) across-country inequality, resulting in an overall decline of inequality
at the world level.
2.3 Estimation of the eﬀects of the Brain Drain on economic growth and the
implications for the world distribution of income
The theoretical model will show that the Brain Drain can have a positive or negative eﬀect on
growth in the sending economy. Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2003) have estimated the net
6In terms of total numbers, the main international suppliers of brains are the Philippines (1.126 million), India
(1.037 million), Mexico (0.923 million) and China (0.816 million). Note that the UK (1.441 million) and Germany
(0.848 million) complete the top of the list. See Docquier and Marfouk (2005).
5growth eﬀect (i.e., once emigration is netted out) of the brain drain using country speciﬁce ﬀects.
Their results show that countries that experience positive growth eﬀects (the ’winners’) generally
combine low levels of human capital and low migration rates, whereas the ’losers’ are typically
characterized by high migration rates and/or high enrolment rates in higher education There seems
to be more losers than winners, but the latter include the largest countries in terms of demographic
size (China, India, Indonesia, Brazil) and represents more than 80 percent of the total population
of the sample. Again, the implication for the WDI seems to be that brain drain migration will
accelerate the rate of convergence of the main big ”globalizers” and further marginalize small
countries with high skilled emigration rates such as African and Carribean countries, which appear
to be the main losers. If anything, the implied impact on the world distribution of income will
strengthen the trends predicted by Sala-I-Martin (2006): a decrease in global inequality in the
next few decades as India, China and other Asian countries catch up, and then a renewed increase
in global inequality as the presence of diverging countries will be increasingly palpable.
3 The Theoretical Model
In this section we describe the dynamics of an economy when there is no migration. We model the
rate of growth of frontier technology, g, as an important determinant of the relative productivity
of skilled and unskilled workers, following Galor and Moav (2000). Agents live for two periods
and are endowed with one unit of labor in their second period. Agents are identical in all respects
except for their level of ability, a, which we will assume is distributed uniformly over the unit
interval, [0,1] and independently of the ability level of their parent. To become skilled an agent
must be educated at a cost to their parents. If the agent becomes skilled, then agent i can supply
gt + ai eﬃciency units of skilled labor. Otherwise the agent remains unskilled and supplies one
eﬃciency unit of unskilled labor. This implies that an increase in the rate of technological progress
will increase the number of eﬃciency units a skilled worker supplies and so will increase the relative
wage of skilled workers.
In each period t output, Yt, may be produced using two factors of production, skilled labor,
Ht, and unskilled labor Lt, under perfect competition. The levels of Ht and Lt are determined
endogenously by the optimal decisions of agents. The level of technology, At,i ne a c hp e r i o di s
given and technological progress from one period to the next is related to the level of human capital
accumulation in the economy and so is also determined endogenously. Although, as described
above, the rate of technological progress is skill-biased, the level of technology is skill neutral.
6We ﬁrst set out the production function and factor prices before analyzing agents’ fertility
and education decisions and the economy’s dynamics.
3.1 Production and Factor Prices





where Ht and Lt are the levels of skilled labor in the economy.
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3.2 Individuals’ Preferences and Budget Constraints
Individuals live for two periods and are identical in all respects except for their levels of ability, a,
which we will assume is distributed uniformly over the unit interval, [0,1] and independently of
the ability level of their parent. In their ﬁrst period of life they are dependent on their parent and
may or may not become skilled. Skilled individuals can supply gt + ai eﬃciency units of skilled
labor while those remaining unskilled can supply one eﬃciency unit of unskilled labor.
Individuals make optimal decisions over fertility, consumption and the training of their
oﬀspring (Becker (1981)). Following Galor and Mountford (2006) and Moav (2005) the preferences
of a member of generation t (i.e. an individual who is born in period t−1)a r ed e ﬁned over their





Individuals are assumed to be ‘small’ and so take the wage rate and growth rate in periods t and
t+1as given. Individuals optimally allocate their time between labor force participation and child
rearing. Denoting the time required to bring up skilled oﬀspring as, τs,a n dt h et i m er e q u i r e dt o
bring up unskilled oﬀspring as, τu, where we assume that 0 < τu < τs < 1, the budget constraint
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t for i = s, u (5)
where nH
t and nL
t are the measures of skilled and unskilled oﬀspring respectively.
3.3 Optimization
An individual’s fertility decision is a continuous one. Agents thus choose a measure of fertility, n,
where n is almost surely not an integer and each oﬀspring is of measure zero.7 For each oﬀspring
the parent must make an education decision. Since each family is a price taker in the labor market
this amounts to choosing a threshold ability level, a?, such that all oﬀspring with ability level
above a? will be educated.
Am e m b e ri of generation t’s optimization problem can thus be written as the following
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such that, for i = s,u,
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3.3.1 The Education Decision
Optimization with respect to a? implies that
(wH





a?(gt+1 + ai)di + wL
t+1a? =
τs − τu
τs(1 − a?)+τua? (10)
Equation (10) provides an intuitive condition for the parental educational choice. If the cost of
rearing skilled and unskilled oﬀspring were the same, then it would be optimal to educate oﬀspring
up to the point where the earnings of the marginal worker, with ability level a?, would be the
7This is a sensible approach in the representative agent framework and is commonly used in the literature, see
for example Becker (1981).
8same whether s/he became skilled or not. However the extra cost of rearing skilled oﬀspring
implies that parents will need to get a greater return from education i.e. the opportunity costs
of education is the possibility of increasing fertility by (τs − τu)/(τs(1 − a?)+τua?). Hence in
equilibrium it must be the case that wH
t+1(gt+1 + a?) is greater than wL
t+1.
3.4 Technological Progress
We assume, following Galor and Moav (2000), that the rate of technological progress, gt ≡ (At −
At−1)/At−1 is an increasing function of the skill intensity of the economy.8 That is.
gt = φ(ht−1), where φ0(ht−1) > 0. (11)
3.5 Equilibrium In An Economy With No Migration
In this section we show that there exists a unique equilibrium level of a?. We further show that
an exogenous increase in the rate of growth decreases the equilibrium level of a? and so increases
the proportion of oﬀspring becoming educated and reduces the rate of fertility. These properties
of the equilibrium are set out in the following propositions.
Proposition 1 There a unique equilibrium level of a?











which is an increasing function of a?. This is the ratio of inverse factor supply functions and is
labelled ‘supply’ in Figure 3.











which is a decreasing function of a?. This is the inverse ratio of inverse factor demand functions
and is labelled ‘demand’ in Figure 3.
Figure 3 plots both these conditions and illustrates the equilibrium level of a? ¤
8The assumption of a positive relationship between growth and human capital accumulation is a common one in
the literature, see for example Nelson and Phelps (1966), Findlay (1978), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) and also
Galor Moav (2004).who provide an excellent survey of empirical support for this relationship.
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Figure 3 A unique equilibrium level of a? under no migration
Proposition 2 An exogenous increase in the rate of growth, gt, increases the equilibrium level of
ht.











Totally diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to gt+1 for every given level of a∗ and rear-




(1 − α)(1 − a?)/αa? − τu/τs
(1 − α)[a?(gt+1 + a?)+
R 1
a?(g + ai)di)]/α +( τs(1 − a?)+τua?)/τs
Hence da?
dgt+1 < 0 iﬀ (1 − α)(1 − a?)/αa? < τu/τs. But given that gt+1 > 0 this will always be the
case. Thus an increase in gt+1 reduces a? and so increases ht+1. ¤
Corollary 1 An increase in the rate of growth, gt, decreases the equilibrium level of nt.
Proof. This follows from equation (9) and proposition 2 ¤
103 . 6 G r o w t hD y n a m i c sI nA nE c o n o m yW i t hN oM i g r a t i o n
Proposition 2 shows that ht is an increasing continuous function of gt and from equation (11) gt+1
is an increasing function of ht. Together these imply the following ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation
for the growth rate of technology,
gt+1 = φ(ht(gt)) (14)
where from above it follows that dgt+1/dgt > 0.

























Figure 4a. Growth Dynamics for Figure 4b. The growth Dynamics for
a Unique Steady state level of g Multiple steady state levels of g
4 The Impact of Brain Drain Migration On Both The Sending
and Receiving Economies
In this section we will describe the eﬀects of a permanent Brain Drain on both the sending and
receiving economies. We show that a brain drain can increase the growth rate in both the sending
and receiving economies. We do this for each economy separately. In section 5 we put the two
economies together and show how it is possible for a core-periphery equilibrium to exist. We
assume that migration is limited to a proportion, x%, of the receiving economy’s population. This
is an intuitive assumption and as shown in the appendix it is also one that can be supported as
an equilibrium policy in a straightforward political economy model of immigration.
4.1 The Eﬀects of Permanent Skilled Immigration on an Economy
The permanent immigration of skilled workers to an economy will have both static and dynamic
eﬀects on the receiving economy. The static eﬀect reduces the proportion of indigenous agents
11who choose to become skilled workers and this ceteris paribus increases the fertility rate. The
dynamic eﬀect is for the receiving economy to converge to a new higher steady state growth rate.
This has a positive eﬀect on the proportion of agents who choose to become skilled workers and a
negative eﬀect on the fertility rate. Thus if the dynamic eﬀe c to u t w e i g h st h es t a t i ce ﬀect, the long
run eﬀect of the permanent immigration of skilled workers will be a raised level of human capital
accumulation, a lower fertility rate and an increase in the growth rate in the receiving economy.
We demonstrate these results in the following subsections
4.1.1 The Static Eﬀects of Skilled Immigration
The immigration of skilled workers to an economy will, ceteris paribus, decrease the equilibrium
wage skilled workers. This will, ceteris paribus, reduce the proportion of indigenous agents who
choose to become skilled workers and so increase the fertility rate. Nevertheless the proportion of
skilled labor in the economy, h, will increase as a result of the skilled immigration. This is shown
in the following lemma and corollary where we denote the equilibrium ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor after the immigration of x% skilled workers, as hA
BD(x).
Lemma 1 The immigration of x% skilled workers in the advanced economy A, ceteris paribus
increases the equilibrium ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, with hA
BD(x) an increasing function of
x.
Proof. Using Figure 5 and equations (13) and (12). An inﬂow of x% skilled workers will shift the
factor price relationship (13) upward. i.e. the increased supply of skilled labor will increase the
equilibrium level of wL
t /wH
t for every given level of a?. The relationship between wL
t /wH
t and the
optimal threshold level of a? is not aﬀected by the inﬂow of skilled workers. Thus as Figure 5 shows,
in equilibrium the optimal level of at a? rises but so does wL
t /wH
t .. Since wL
t /wH
t = ((1−α)/α)ht
this implies that ht also rises in equilibrium. ¤


















Figure 5 For a given growth rate, skilled immigration reduces the proportion of indigenous agents becoming skilled
Corollary 2 The immigration of skilled workers in the advanced economy A, ceteris paribus in-
creases the fertility rate, nt, of economy A.
Proof. From Lemma 1 we know that an inﬂow of skilled workers will increase the optimal
level of a? and hence from equation (9) the corollary follows. ¤
4.1.2 The Dynamic Eﬀect of Skilled Immigration
For every given level of gt, lemma 1. shows that the inﬂow of x% skilled workers will increase the
equilibrium level of ht. This will increase gt+1 and so may lead ultimately to a fall in fertility in
the receiving economy as the following lemma and corollary demonstrate.
Lemma 2 The permanent immigration of x% skilled workers in the advanced economy A,i n -
creases the equilibrium growth rate of economy A.
Proof. The inﬂow of x% skilled workers increases the equilibrium level of ht This implies that
the dynamic equation now becomes gt = φ(ht−1(gt−1,x)) where ht−1 is an increasing function of
both arguments. Thus as depicted in Figure 6. A permanent immigration of x% skilled workers
each period shifts up the function φ(ht−1(gt−1,x)) relative to φ(ht−1(gt−1,0)) and so increases the
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Figure 6. Dynamic eﬀects of Brain Drain Immigration
This implies that if the growth eﬀect is suﬃciently strong, permanent skilled immigration
can increase human capital levels and reduce the fertility levels in the receiving economy. This is
s h o w ni nt h ef o l l o w i n gc o r o l l a r y
Corollary 3 If the growth eﬀect from permanent skilled immigration is suﬃciently strong, then
permanent skilled immigration can increase human capital levels and reduce the rate of population
growth in the receiving economy
Proof. By example. Consider the economy where α =1 /3,τs =0 .95,τu = τs/2,θ =1 /3. Then if
g =0 .01 then a? =0 .819 and n =1 .188. If there is a 1% inﬂow of skilled immigrants each period
and g remains at 0.01 then a? rises to 0.820 and n rises to 1.189. If however there is a 1% inﬂow
o fs k i l l e di m m i g r a n t se a c hp e r i o da n dg rises to 0.5 then a? falls to 0.817 and n falls to 1.186. . ¤
We will call the condition under which this happens as Condition A.
Condition A A permanent skilled immigration increases human capital levels and reduces the
rate of population growth in the receiving economy
Note that if, in the spirit of Azardiadis and Drazen (1990), there is a threshold externality
in the gt = φ(ht−1) relationship then the increase g due to a Brain Drain immigration can be made
arbitrariliy large so that condition A holds. Such a case is depicted in Figure 4b
144.2 The Eﬀects of Skilled Emigration on an Economy
The emigration of skilled workers may increase or decrease the growth rate in the sending economy.
This case has been analyzed in the literature before, see for example Mountford (1997) and Kanbur
and Rapoport (2005), and the same intuition applies here. The loss of emigrating skilled agents
will ceteris paribus reduce the level of ht but the possibility of emigration will also increase the
incentive to accumulate human capital. In this section we demonstrate that the latter eﬀect
dominates the former if emigration is limited and if the wage gain from emigration is suﬃciently
high.
We will assume that the sending economy takes the immigration policy of the receiving
economy as given, so that each level of x% of the working population of the receiving economy
translates into a maximum number, M, of emigrants from the sending economy. We will also
assume that the ability to emigrate is randomly allocated in the event that there are an excess of
qualiﬁed candidates and so the probability of successful emigration, p,i se q u a lt oMt/(1−a?)NB
t
where NB
t is the population of the sending economy in period t.9












a?(gt+1 + ai)di − M(g +( 1+a?)/2)
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t+1 are the skilled and
unskilled wages in the sending economy B.
The individual agents’ decision problem is also changed by the possibility of emigration. A



















t+1 is the skilled wage in the receiving economy, economy A. This expression is maximized
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9We are assuming that the receiving economy can only observe the level of education of an agent not his/her
level of ability, ai.








t+1 for every level
of a? than that in equation (12) for when there is no migration.
Lemma 3 The ability of M skilled workers to emigrate from the less advanced economy, B,t ot h e
advanced economy A, increases the proportion of agents who choose to become skilled in economy,
B.
Proof. Using equations (15) and (17) and Figure 3. Noting that an increase in M shifts down the









t+1 in equation (17) is always above that for when there is no migration in equation
(12) then using Figure 3 it follows that the equilibrium level of a∗ will be lowered by Brain Drain
emigration. . ¤
Corollary 4 The ability of M skilled workers to emigrate from the less advanced economy, B,
decreases the fertility rate of economy B
Proof. From Lemma 3 we know that an outﬂow of M skilled workers will decrease the
optimal level of a? in economy B and hence from equation (9) the corollary follows. ¤
Whether the emigration of M skilled workers raises the equilibrium level of h in economy B
depends on whether the positive eﬀect of an increase in human skill accumulation is stronger than
the negative eﬀect of emigration. In the following proposition we show that if w
H,A
t+1 is suﬃciently
high for a given level of M then the level of h in economy B will increase.
Lemma 4 The ability of M skilled workers to emigrate from the less advanced economy, B,t o
the advanced economy A, increases the equilibrium level of ht in economy, B if the skilled wage
in the advanced economy, w
H,A
t+1 is suﬃciently large




t+1 in equation (15) does not depend on w
H,A
t+1









t+1 in equation (17) does depend on w
H,A

























which implies that an increase in w
H,A





t+1 for a given level of M ¤
165 The Dynamics of the World Economy Under Brain Drain Mi-
gration.
In this section we ﬁrst derive analytical results showing how a ‘core-periphery’ equilibrium may be
a stable equilibrium for the world economy. These results are derived under the assumption that
the advanced economy is small relative to the less advanced sending economy.in the population
dimension. It is shown in the core periphery equilibrium that Brain Drain migration patterns are
permanent and that the Brain Drain increases growth in both the sending and receiving economies,
although it also causes an increase in income inequality.between countries.
When the population of the advanced economy is not small relative to the less advanced
economy the dynamics of the world economy are described by a four dimensional ﬁrst order
system of diﬀerence equations in the relative technology levels, the relative population levels,
and the initial growth rates in both economies. A complete analytical description of this four
dimensional system is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead we simulate the world economy
and show the conditions under which the model can produce the same qualitative properties as
the stylised facts presented in section 2. We begin by describing the dynamics of technological
diﬀusion in the world economy.
5.1 Technological Diﬀusion in the World Economy
We assume that frontier art technology diﬀuses from the most advanced economy, A,t ot h el e s s
advanced economy, B with a lag.10 In keeping with the discussion in section 3 we assume that this
diﬀusion of technology raises the level of technology and increases the productivity of both skilled
and unskilled labor in an unbiased manner. This contrasts with the growth of frontier knowledge
which following Galor and Moav (2000) is assumed to be skill biased.11 We follow Findlay (1978)
and Nelson and Phelps (1966) in assuming that the rate of diﬀusion is positively related to the
human capital intensity in economy B, hB, and the size of the gap between the technological levels








10See Keller (2001) for evidence on the importance of technological diﬀusion for technology growth in developing
economies.
11One can allow for diﬀused technological growth to be skill biased so long as the skill bias for an economy whose
technological growth is signiﬁcantly dependent on international technology diﬀusion is signiﬁcantly less than that
for an economy whose technological growth is completely due to increasing frontier technology.
12See Basu and Weil (1998) for a discussion of the issue of diﬀerent types of advances in technology and on the
importance of appropriate factor endowments for technology diﬀusion.
17Note that if gA,gB and λ are constants satisfying gA >g B − λ then repeated substitution
gives the variation on Nelson and Phelps’s (1966) result that the technological level of economy




λ + gA − gBAA
t (22)
where this fraction is decreasing in the rate of growth of the advanced economy, gA.
Of course in general hB
t will not be constant through time but we show in our simulation
section that this ratio will approximately hold in the limit. However as we detail in the following
section gB and λ can be treated as constants under the assumption that economy B is large in
terms of population relative to the advanced economy, A.
5.2 Existence of a Core Periphery Equilibrium in the World Economy
In this section we assume that economy B is large in terms of population relative to the advanced
economy, A. It is shown that if condition A holds then a stable ‘core-periphery’ equilibrium of
the world economy will exist. It is shown that in such a core-periphery equilibrium, Brain Drain
migration will increase the rate of growth in both the sending and receiving economies, but will
also increase income inequality between countries. This is described in the following propositions
and corollaries.
Proposition 3 (Core-Periphery Equilibrium)
If economies A and B are identical except for their levels of population and technology, where
AA
t >A B
t and A is small relative to economy B in terms of population and Condition A holds, then
a ‘Core-Periphery’ equilibrium will be a stable equilibrium of the world economy. This equilibrium
has the following two properties
(i) there is a permanent Brain Drain migration of agents from economy B to economy A,
(ii) the level of output per capita in economy B will be a constant fraction of that in economy A.
Proof. The assumption that economy B is large relative to economy A implies that the probability




t+1 as the probability
of emigration goes to zero, economy B tends to its autarkic equilibrium. From lemma 2 this implies
that gA−gB. If condition A is satisﬁed then economy A’s rate of population growth will be below
that of economy B. Thus the equilibrium is stable: economy A will maintain its lead in frontier
technology while economy B will maintain its lead in population size. ¤
18Corollary 5 In the neighborhood of a Core-Periphery equilibrium income inequality between coun-
tries is increasing in the rate of Brain Drain migration
Proof. This follows as economy B is close to its autarkic equilibrium then hB
t can be treated as
a constant through time and hence gB and λ can be treated as constants. Once economy A is in
the neighborhood of its new steady state then hA
t and so gA can also be treated as a constant.
Hence equation (22) holds and it follows that the ratio of AB
t /AA
t declines when gA increases. ¤
Corollary 6 In the neighborhood of a Core-Periphery equilibrium world growth is increasing in
the rate of Brain Drain migration
Proof. Growth in economy A will increase from lemma 2 and growth in economy B will increase
from the technology diﬀu s i o ne q u a t i o n( 2 1 ). ¤
Finally one should emphasize that Condition A is a suﬃcient but not a necessary condition
for the Core-Periphery equilibrium to be locally stable. If economies A and B diﬀer for exogenous
reasons, such as diﬀerences in growth institutions, so that under no migration gA >g B it follows
from corollary 1 that the rate of population growth in economy B is greater than that in economy
A. Brain Drain migration will thus reinforce the pattern of relative technological growth rates but,
if condition A does not hold, it will work against the pattern of relative population growth rates.
However as long as the population growth rate in economy B is greater than that in economy A
then a Core-Periphery equilibrium will be stable.
5.3 Simulations of the Evolution of the World Economy
In this section we display the results from simulations of the two country world economy described
above We concentrate on the case where both economies are identical in every respect except for
their population size, their technological level and their initial economy The case where economies
diﬀer for some fundamental reason e.g. growth promoting institution, follows routinely on from the
cases discussed herey We ﬁrst discuss the simulation results for the core periphery case described
in section 5.2. We then describe the case of two similar economies where the sending economy’s
skill intensity falls after Brain Drain emigration. Our third case describes the case where Brain
Drain emigration causes a large incentive to invest in human capital in the sending economy.
5.3.1 Core-Periphery Equilibrium
The simulations for a core periphery equilibrium are displayed in Figure 7. In the core periphery
equilibrium we set the technological diﬀerence between the two economies to be initially large
19with AA =1 0and AB =1and the level of immigration into A to be low at 0.1% of A’s working
population. We also set α =1 /3,θ =1 /3, τs =0 .85,τu =0 .6,NA =1 0 0and NB = 100.
Finally the dynamic equations are set such that economy A is above a dynamic growth threshold
so that gA
t+1 =( hA
t )0.5 while economy B is below a growth threshold so that gB
t+1 =( hB
t )0.5/1000
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Figure 7 The eﬀect on skill intensity of Brain Drain migration, starting in period 10
in both the sending and receiving economies
Brain Drain migration begins in period 10. The simulations show that this causes the skill
intensity to rise in economy A which quickly converges to a new steady state. The skill intensity
in economy B also rises as the incentive to invest in human capital is high since the technological
diﬀerence between A and B is large while the actual numbers leaving economy B is small. This
situation is stable as the population growth rate of economy B is higher than that of economy A
and so gradually the incentive to invest in human capital in economy B falls as the probability of
successfully emigrating falls.
5.3.2 Dynamics of Two Similar Economies
In contrast to the core periphery equilibrium, this section shows the results of two nearly identical





t )0.5 and λ =0 .99. Thus the technological level of the two
economies is nealy identical. We set the level of immigration into A to be 5% of A’s working
population and the initial level of populations to be NA = 100 and NB = 2500. The other
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Figure 8
Brain Drain migration begins in period 10. The simulations show that as before this causes
the skill intensity to rise in economy A which quickly converges to a new steady state. The skill
intensity in economy B now declines as the incentive to invest in human capital is low since the
technological diﬀerence between A and B is very small and the numbers leaving economy B are
not insignﬁcant. Under these parameters this situation is not stable as the population growth
rate of economy B is lower than that of economy A and so gradually the incentive to invest in
human capital in economy B rises as agents’ probability of successful emigration rises. If economy
B diﬀered fundamentally from economy A so that it had a signiﬁcantly large population growth
then this situation would be stable.
5.3.3 Catching Up Dynamics
In this example we show the importance of the migration propensity for the determination of
t h ee q u i l i b r i u m . W ec h o o s et h ep a r a m e t e r si nt h i se x a m p l et ob ep r e c i s e l yt h es a m ea si nt h e
core periphery equilibrium example above, except that now we have a much larger immigration
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Figure 9 The eﬀect on skill intensity of Brain Drain migration, starting in period 10
where the migration probability is signiﬁcantly higher than in the core-periphery case
As before Brain Drain migration begins in period 10. Now in contrast to the core periphery
case the larger incentive to invest in human capital accumulation due to the greater chance of
successful emigration causes the level of hB to rise markedly. This also reduces the fertility rate
and so reduces B’s population relative to A and so further increases the probability of successful
emigration. This increases the incentive to invest in human capital and so on. Again if economy
B diﬀered fundamentally from economy A so that it had a suﬃciently larger population growth
then this equilibrium would not occur.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has analyzed the implications of the current trend towards predominantly skilled, or
Brain Drain, emigration from poor to rich countries on fertility and human capital formation and
growth in both the sending and receiving countries It has shown that this pattern of migration may
cause fertility to fall and human capital accumulation to rise in both the sending and receiving
economies. It has also shown that this migration pattern may cause the world economy to converge
to a special kind of core-periphery equilibrium where increasing inequality between countries is
fueled by Brain Drain migration but where, nonetheless, world poverty is reduced, world growth
is increased and the income of agents in both the core and the periphery is increased.
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24Table 1. The brain drain to the six major immigration countries - a long run view
By region 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
AMERICA 2.0% 2.0% 2.5% 2.6% 2.7% 3.1% 1.40 1.35 1.35 1.28 1.09 1.04
  USA and Canada 0.9% 0.9% 1.1% 0.9% 0.8% 0.8% 1.15 1.13 1.36 1.30 1.24 1.25
  Caribbean 54.2% 47.3% 45.3% 42.2% 39.7% 41.9% 5.61 4.67 3.83 3.41 3.11 2.87
  Central America 13.8% 10.8% 12.9% 13.1% 16.3% 16.6% 3.08 2.32 2.01 1.78 1.60 1.45
  South America 3.6% 3.4% 3.7% 3.7% 3.6% 4.2% 7.14 6.73 5.59 4.96 4.41 4.04
EUROPE 6.1% 6.2% 5.8% 5.3% 4.5% 5.6% 2.14 2.15 2.11 2.03 1.83 2.02
  Eastern Europe 2.1% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.0% 3.4% 2.35 2.89 2.96 3.00 2.32 2.75
  Rest of Europe 9.0% 8.4% 7.9% 7.0% 6.0% 7.0% 2.04 1.87 1.83 1.74 1.68 1.83
       incl. EU15 8.6% 8.1% 7.7% 6.8% 6.0% 6.7% 2.01 1.84 1.81 1.72 1.74 1.83
       incl. EU25 8.9% 8.6% 8.1% 7.3% 6.3% 7.2% 2.06 1.94 1.92 1.85 1.88 1.98
AFRICA 7.3% 7.5% 9.2% 8.9% 9.0% 9.2% 8.30 8.10 9.72 9.33 8.68 8.63
  Northern Africa 9.9% 8.2% 9.1% 6.6% 6.6% 6.3% 3.93 3.19 3.86 3.02 3.11 3.13
  Sub-Saharan Africa 6.2% 7.1% 9.3% 10.8% 10.8% 11.7% 17.89 18.55 19.69 20.32 16.43 15.80
ASIA 3.8% 4.2% 4.8% 4.7% 4.8% 5.1% 10.81 11.10 10.50 9.21 8.26 7.82
  Eastern Asia 2.2% 2.4% 3.1% 3.1% 3.3% 3.5% 13.06 13.94 13.01 10.91 10.38 9.55
  South-central Asia 3.3% 3.9% 3.8% 4.1% 4.1% 4.9% 13.43 15.57 12.62 12.13 10.63 10.69
  South-eastern Asia 9.1% 9.4% 11.3% 10.1% 9.8% 9.3% 16.11 14.63 11.73 9.09 7.63 6.49
  Near and Middle East 12.3% 9.2% 9.1% 7.0% 5.9% 6.0% 3.82 2.64 2.90 2.47 2.05 2.13
OCEANIA 3.7% 3.8% 4.6% 4.5% 5.4% 6.1% 1.91 1.83 1.70 1.69 1.58 1.73
  Australia and New Zealand 3.2% 3.3% 3.8% 3.6% 4.2% 4.9% 1.78 1.60 1.46 1.44 1.36 1.53
  Other Pacific countries 45.5% 47.7% 50.2% 50.3% 49.3% 44.4% 16.43 20.52 14.33 14.62 10.23 8.48
Selected countries 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
  Argentina 2.6% 3.2% 3.2% 2.6% 2.1% 2.1% 6.33 6.90 5.63 4.31 3.45 3.00
  Brazil 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.6% 8.25 8.51 7.40 7.37 6.95 6.74
  China 2.5% 3.1% 3.8% 2.6% 3.1% 3.3% 32.04 38.84 36.12 21.31 21.94 19.06
  India 2.9% 3.2% 2.7% 2.8% 3.2% 4.1% 13.75 15.40 11.82 11.34 12.02 12.55
  Indonesia 3.3% 5.6% 8.3% 2.6% 1.9% 1.4% 43.89 70.23 96.32 28.50 18.23 14.00
  Korea 4.4% 4.3% 4.8% 5.3% 4.0% 4.4% 6.02 5.51 4.28 3.83 2.68 2.44
  Mexico 11.4% 8.8% 9.9% 10.5% 13.9% 15.0% 2.28 1.69 1.46 1.39 1.31 1.24
  Russia  -   -   -   -  0.1% 1.2%  -   -   -   -  0.79 2.88
  Saudi Arabia 3.5% 3.9% 3.0% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 13.71 17.35 16.35 5.87 5.66 5.83
  South Africa 6.0% 12.0% 11.6% 11.1% 6.7% 6.7% 8.97 18.01 14.88 14.21 6.37 6.01
  Turkey 11.5% 7.5% 7.2% 6.5% 6.2% 5.3% 2.54 1.45 1.61 1.56 1.30 1.18
Source: Docquier and Defoort (2005)
Skilled emigration rates Selection bias (skilled/total migration rate)Table 2. International migration data for selected countries and country groups in 2000
Share in the world 
population





Large countries (Pop>25 million) 84.2% 60.6% 63.9% 1.3% 4.1% 3.144 11.3% 36.4%
Upper-Middle (25>Pop>10) 10.0% 15.8% 15.2% 3.1% 8.8% 2.839 11.0% 33.2%
Lower-Middle (10>Pop>2.5) 5.2% 16.4% 15.7% 5.8% 13.5% 2.338 13.0% 33.1%
Small countries (Pop<2.5) 0.6% 3.7% 3.7% 10.3% 27.5% 2.666 10.5% 34.7%





High Income countries 16.0% 30.4% 33.7% 2.8% 3.5% 1.238 30.7% 38.3%
Upper-Middle Income countries 10.3% 24.3% 17.7% 4.2% 7.9% 1.867 13.0% 25.2%
Lower-Middle Income countries 15.6% 26.6% 27.2% 3.2% 7.6% 2.383 14.2% 35.4%
Low Income countries 58.1% 15.1% 19.8% 0.5% 6.1% 12.120 3.5% 45.1%





AMERICA 13.6% 27.2% 22.9% 3.3% 3.3% 1.002 29.6% 29.7%
  USA and Canada 5.2% 2.9% 4.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.127 51.3% 57.9%
  Caribbean 0.5% 5.3% 5.8% 15.3% 42.8% 2.807 9.3% 38.6%
  Central America 2.2% 14.2% 6.7% 11.9% 16.9% 1.418 11.1% 16.6%
  South America 5.7% 4.9% 5.7% 1.6% 5.1% 3.219 12.3% 41.2%
EUROPE 11.9% 37.0% 33.3% 4.1% 7.0% 1.717 17.9% 31.7%
  Eastern Europe 5.0% 8.1% 7.9% 2.2% 4.3% 1.930 17.4% 34.2%
  Rest of Europe 6.9% 28.9% 25.4% 5.2% 8.6% 1.637 18.3% 31.0%
       incl. EU15 6.2% 23.8% 21.9% 4.8% 8.1% 1.685 18.6% 32.5%
       incl. EU25 7.4% 28.5% 26.5% 4.9% 8.7% 1.789 17.6% 32.8%
AFRICA 13.1% 7.9% 6.9% 1.5% 10.4% 7.031 4.0% 30.9%
  Northern Africa 2.8% 4.0% 2.2% 2.9% 7.3% 2.489 7.5% 19.6%
  Sub-Saharan Africa 10.3% 3.9% 4.7% 1.0% 13.1% 13.287 2.8% 42.5%
ASIA 60.8% 26.4% 35.1% 0.8% 5.5% 7.123 6.3% 46.8%
  Eastern Asia 24.7% 7.3% 11.5% 0.5% 3.9% 8.544 6.3% 55.5%
  South-central Asia 24.4% 6.3% 9.3% 0.5% 5.3% 10.030 5.0% 52.5%
  South-eastern Asia 8.5% 7.3% 10.6% 1.6% 9.8% 5.980 7.9% 51.4%
  Near and Middle East 3.2% 5.5% 3.6% 3.5% 6.9% 1.937 11.4% 22.9%
OCEANIA 0.5% 1.4% 1.8% 4.3% 6.8% 1.578 27.8% 45.0%
  Australia and New Zealand 0.4% 1.0% 1.4% 3.7% 5.4% 1.479 32.7% 49.2%
  Other Pacific countries 0.1% 0.4% 0.4% 7.6% 48.7% 6.391 3.1% 35.2%





  Argentina 0.6% 0.4% 0.5% 1.0% 2.5% 2.410 19.7% 48.2%
  Brazil 2.8% 0.7% 0.8% 0.4% 2.2% 5.076 8.4% 43.4%
  China 20.9% 3.0% 4.1% 0.2% 3.8% 17.121 2.7% 48.0%
  India 16.7% 3.0% 5.2% 0.4% 4.3% 12.104 4.8% 60.5%
  Indonesia 3.5% 0.4% 0.5% 0.2% 2.1% 9.097 5.0% 46.3%
  Korea 1.1% 2.1% 3.3% 2.8% 5.6% 2.034 25.8% 54.1%
  Mexico 1.6% 11.3% 4.6% 12.4% 15.3% 1.229 11.3% 14.4%
  Russia 2.4% 1.0% 1.4% 0.6% 1.5% 2.521 20.1% 51.1%
  Saudi Arabia 0.4% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.9% 5.129 12.5% 64.6%
  South Africa 0.7% 0.5% 0.8% 1.3% 7.5% 5.639 10.4% 62.6%
 Turkey 1.1% 3.5% 0.9% 5.6% 5.8% 1.038 8.5% 8.8%
Source: Own calculations based on Docquier and Marfouk (2005)
Share of skilled workers Rate of emigration
Share in the OECD 
immigration stock